ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LETTING THE TIGERS FREE.

Professor Errol P. Mendes⁽¹⁾

"Asia has a rich heritage of democracy-oriented philosophies and traditions. Asia has already made great strides towards democratisation and possessed the necessary conditions to develop democracy even beyond the level of the West...Asia should lose no time in firmly establishing democracy and strengthening human rights. The biggest obstacle is not its cultural heritage but the resistance of authoritarian rulers and their apologists...Culture is not necessarily our destiny. Democracy is."

Kim Dae-jung, "Asia's Destiny",

December 31, 1994⁽²⁾

Introduction

The fundamental thesis that this paper will explore is whether universal conceptions of human rights are incompatible with "Asian Values", however they are defined. As noted elsewhere, the most fervent exponents of this thesis are the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, the present Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed⁽³⁾ and, more recently, President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China.⁽⁴⁾

The Recent Rise of Rhetoric over the "Clash of Civilizations".⁽⁵⁾

As the economies of Asia, in particular South East Asia, have rapidly grown, the promotion of Asian Values over Western notions of democracy and human rights has intensified. This has also coincided with the end of the Cold War. As has been noted elsewhere, during the Cold War, many Asian governments took advantage of the geopolitical struggle to get the West to support their authoritarian systems, as long as they were engaged actively in the struggle against communism. This is especially true of Indonesia when the authoritarian government of President Suharto came into power by an anti-communist coup in 1965. Since then, under the New Order concept of "Demokrasi Pancasila", the President has maintained a form of "managed and authorised democracy" with little respect for real constitutional order and fundamental human rights.⁽⁶⁾ Only with the recent street riots in Jakarta, and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to two East Timorese human rights advocates, has the international community begun to really focus on how President Suharto's managed and authorised democracy may be antithetical to long term peace and security in the region.⁽⁷⁾

With the demise of the Soviet Union, however, and the transformation into a market economy of the most important Asian socialist state, namely China, many Western countries and Western-based international human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began to develop a more vocal and critical focus on the authoritarian Asian states. A new justification for the existence of authoritarian states was needed by their rulers.⁽⁸⁾

Asia, and in particular South East Asia and China, has experienced the strongest economic growth in the world. As will be discussed below, much of this growth has been based on a low-cost export-oriented industrialisation strategy which has worked well in a political environment that discourages independent trade unionism and pluralism.⁽⁹⁾ While low-cost export oriented industrialisation strategies in some Asian countries, including the utilization of cheap labour, may have contributed to their global competitiveness, one author, Mehmet, has also noted that low-cost labour strategies are central to the explanation of how rampant corruption, at least in Indonesia, does not retard economic growth. Rent-seeking by elites is achieved by "gate keeping": privileged access to information and control over decision making, based on issuing permits and licenses in the political, economic, military and labour sectors.⁽¹⁰⁾ Concentration of coercive powers in the executive branch of government encourages rent-seeking by gate-keepers, and such concentration is the root cause of much of the abuse of human rights and undermining of the Rule of Law in these societies.⁽¹¹⁾

However, these authoritarian gate-keepers had to come up with a more altruistic justification. That justification came in the form of the defence of "Asian Values" in the face of alleged hegemonic campaigns by the West against the economically vibrant economies of Asia, using human rights as the main weapon. In 1994, Dr. Mahathir summed up this new defence as follows:

"Much later the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed leaving a unipolar world. All pretence at non-interference in the affairs of independent nations was dropped. A new international order was enunciated in which the powerful countries claim a right to impose their system of Government, their free market and their concept of human rights on every country.

"All countries must convert to the multi-party system of government and practise the liberal views on human rights as conceived by the Europeans and the North Americans.

...

"It would seem that Asians have no right to define and practise their own set of values about human rights. What we are asked is Asian Values? The question is rhetorical because the implication is that Asians cannot possibly understand human rights, much less set up their own values."⁽¹²⁾

The question that arises from this rationale for "Asian Values" is whether they are being used, as one author puts it, to "promote not just nation-building, but regime legitimation, and when they are used to silence dissenting voices and arbitrarily exclude or include certain groups, then such arguments should be seen for what they are -- an attempt by governments and political elites to establish or maintain the control of their people by creating new ideological orthodoxies, based on a contrived notion of a pan-Asian culture and value system."⁽¹³⁾

This thesis of "Asian Values" as a form of regime legitimation will be explored below.

What are Asian Values?

The most immediate criticism that the term Asian Values faces even before it can be defined is that it implies a homogeneous Asia. The reality is that this region has a kaleidoscopic panorama of languages, religions, cultures, history, political systems and intra-Asian rivalries, prejudices, hatreds, affinities, etc.

However, the elites who created the concept of Asian Values in the early 1990s were not ignorant of these realities. So what did they have in mind?

The most prominent of the advocates of Asian Values are those who belong to what can be termed 1) The Singapore School⁽¹⁴⁾, 2) The Mahathir Model and, more recently, what I term 3) the China PTCN (Post-Tiananmen-Confucianism-Nationalism) model.

Turning to the Singapore School, the most articulate of this group includes the former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, the present Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, a retired senior diplomat Tommy Koh and the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Asian Values thesis of all these leaders of the Singapore School is in essence the same: The West refuses to accept the legitimacy of Asian Values because it cannot accept that East Asia is becoming a centre of World power and that a psychological revolution is taking place in East Asia as Asians recover from their colonial past and are discovering that they can do things as good as, or even better than, the West. East Asians are getting their economic, social and political fundamentals right, whereas Europe and North America are getting bogged down with their democratic systems that emphasize individual rights and seem so vulnerable to social and economic decay.⁽¹⁵⁾ In terms of what Asian Values should include, Prime Minister Goh has stated:

For success to continue, correct economic policies alone are not enough. Equally important are the noneconomic factors -- a sense of community and nationhood, a disciplined and hardworking people, strong moral values and family ties. The type of society determines how we perform. It is not simply materialism and individual rewards which drive Singapore forward. More important, it is the sense of idealism and service born out of a feeling of social solidarity and national identification. Without these crucial factors, we cannot be a happy or dynamic society.⁽¹⁶⁾

The Singapore School clearly seeks to incorporate some of its Confucian heritage into its definition of Asian Values. However, Tommy Koh also admits the dark side of these values includes excessive materialism and inclination to authoritarianism.⁽¹⁷⁾

The Singapore School has a tendency to contrast the socially and economically decaying West, due apparently in large part to the emphasis on individual rights and adversarial politics, against a socially cohesive and duty emphasising East Asia. This contrast is not only highly simplistic, it is simply wrong. In many countries across Asia, we are seeing the patterns familiar in the industrialised West of breakdown of family ties and increasing societal problems, including rapidly escalating crime and drug use.⁽¹⁸⁾

Finally the Singapore School also questions the existence of universal human rights. One leading author of the School claims "...it [is] difficult, if not impossible, to define a single distinctive and coherent human rights regime that can encompass the vast region from Japan to Burma, with its Confucianist, Buddhist, Islamic, and Hindu traditions. Nonetheless, the movement towards such a goal is likely to continue. What is clear is that there is general discontent throughout the region with a purely Western interpretation of human rights."⁽¹⁹⁾

Turning to the Mahathir Model of Asian Values, the present Prime Minister of Malaysia also tends to emphasize the social and moral decay of the West in comparison to the new-found alternative model of Asian development. But Mahathir also emphasizes the "Asia-as-civilization" thesis. Dupont points out that Mahathir leads the clarion call for Asian Values "despite the fact that the Islamic ethos of his country differs markedly from the neo-confucianism of Singapore and other Sino-centred states in East Asia. However, he reconciles this apparent contradiction by subsuming Malaysia's distinctive national character in a broader obeisance to Asian Values."⁽²⁰⁾

It is also suggested that Mahathir has developed his authoritarian Asian Values model for an internal reason linked to the potential for racial tensions in Malaysia. When he came to power in 1980, Dr. Mahathir was seen as a liberal whose early actions included releasing most of the people detained under the Internal Security Act and allowing more press freedom. However, by October 1980, faced with the possibility of race riots, he abandoned all liberal pretences and ordered the detention of over 100 people under the same Internal Security Act, and closed down three newspapers. During his subsequent years, the constitution was amended several times, tougher laws enacted at the expense of individual rights, the opposition in Parliament to the dominant United Malays National Organisation party was reduced to insignificance. Dr. Mahathir changed the fundamental constitutional system in Malaysia, concentrating unprecedented and, in many leading critics' view, dangerous power in the hands of the executive.⁽²¹⁾ In a recent interview, Dr. Mahathir stated he believed that the multiracial, multireligious, multicultural and multilingual differences among Malaysians made open debate dangerous. He continued "The threat is from the inside,...So we have to be armed, so to speak. Not with guns, but with the necessary laws to make sure the country remains stable."⁽²²⁾

Stability and enforced social cohesion in a heterogenous society then becomes internalised as a fundamental core of Asian Values for this leading exponent of the concept.

As has been noted elsewhere, Mahathir has shown some balance in his advocacy of Asian Values. He sees the Asian region as benefitting from and strengthened by the fusion of the best practices and values from many rich civilizations, Asian and Western; that many Asian Values should obviously be destroyed, including feudalism, excessive anti-materialism and excessive deference to authority; that no one should be allowed to hide behind the cloak of cultural relativism.⁽²³⁾

Turning to what I term the China PTCN model, the present Chinese obsession about fighting the West and its own dissidents over human rights and democracy stems from the international outcry and internal fallout from the Tiananmen Square massacre on June 4, 1989, as well as from the more recent struggle for succession in the imminent post Deng Xiaoping era.

In response to the international outcry from the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Chinese government published the Human Rights in China White Paper in 1991. This was a propaganda document which attempted to show that China was incorporating human rights perspectives in its laws and policies, but that such perspectives would be informed by China's painful history and its present social and economic needs. Therefore, the government stated that its fundamental approach to human rights would place the greatest priority on the right to subsistence and economic development as a precondition to the full enjoyment of all other human rights. The underlying message of the White Paper was that stability of the system which was providing the right to subsistence and development was the highest priority of China. Anybody's individual human rights, from those who were massacred at Tiananmen Square to the lone dissidents who had not fled into exile after the June 4, 1989 massacre, could be legitimately sacrificed on the altars of the right to subsistence and development.

Even before the publication of the White Paper, China had begun to assert an Asia-wide role to champion the right to development. The Chinese participated in every session of the governmental experts group organised by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to draft the Declaration on the Right to Development and made positive suggestions until the Declaration was passed by the 41st session of the General Assembly in 1986. It also supported the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in conducting worldwide consultation on the implementation of the Right to Development.

In December of 1991, China also achieved a major coup for Asian Values when it engineered the organising of regional preparatory conferences before the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights. Many Western countries opposed the regional conferences arguing that since human rights were universal there was no need for the regional conferences. An alliance forged by China achieved an expression of Asian Values at the March 1993 Asia Preparatory Conference in the Bangkok declaration signed by 49 governments. The "aspirations and commitments of the Asian region" were emphasized in the document while the concept of the universality of human rights was downplayed. The Bangkok Declaration also included recognition that "while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds."⁽²⁴⁾

Japan and South Korea, while reluctant to do so, finally signed on to the priority of Asian Values to universal conceptions of human rights, unwilling to resist China's desire to show Asian solidarity against Western hegemony on human rights.⁽²⁵⁾ Asian NGOs have also refuted their governments claim that human rights are incompatible with Asian Values. Many of these representatives of Asian civil society have asserted that this emphasis on Asian Values in conflict with human rights is an attempt by authoritarian governments to legitimise their corrupt regimes.⁽²⁶⁾

The final declaration of the actual World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in the summer of 1993 affirmed the universality and indivisibility of human rights. However, the force of Asian Values from the Bangkok Declaration found its way into the final Declaration with several expressions of cultural relativism, including the incongruous affirmation that the Right to Development was as universal and inalienable a right as other fundamental human rights.⁽²⁷⁾

The Chinese delegation could rightly state that the spirit of their 1991 White Paper was reflected in the final declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights.

More recently, in the struggle for succession in the Post Deng Xiaoping era, President Jiang Zemin and his politburo and military allies have attempted to revive the "spiritual civilization" and promote the "socialist ethical and cultural progress" of the Chinese people.⁽²⁸⁾ One leading Asian review predicts that the use of these Chinese Values is an attempt by party chief Jiang Zemin to consolidate his power by dominating political discourse. In practice this will mean more media censorship, patriotic exhortations and an emphasis on traditional virtues such as Confucianism and respect for authority.⁽²⁹⁾ Ironically, Confucianism had been vilified and eradicated from mainstream culture by Mao. Now his successors, seeing a largely cynical populace in the face of the failings of the Communist Party's record, including rampant corruption, are attempting to rehabilitate themselves through a rehabilitation of selective Confucianism.⁽³⁰⁾

The return to the spiritual civilization of the Chinese people is also an attempt to "jump-start" nationalism by exploiting any forms of humiliation suffered by the Chinese people at the hands of foreign powers from the last century right up to the present. Such nationalism is increasingly focusing on shrill criticism of foreign countries, especially the United States and especially targeted on the West's support of Taiwan, the refusal to admit China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a developing nation, the criticism of China's human rights record and fomenting "splittism" in Tibet.⁽³¹⁾ This new reincarnation of Chinese Values seems to be working. A widely publicised study showed that an overwhelming majority of young Chinese consider the U.S. to be their country's arch-enemy. An extremely crude anti-foreign tract entitled "China Can Say No", written by a professor and three mediocre journalists, is a current huge national bestseller. As one senior Chinese newspaper editor stated, "Now, people can't separate criticism of the government from criticism of themselves. It's worrying."⁽³²⁾

The three "Asian Values" models outlined above can be merged to define the substance of the concept as follows: respect for hierarchy and authority including a deference to such authority, centrality and cohesion of the family, social consensus including an avoidance of overt conflict in social relations, an emphasis on law and order and a desire not to have individual liberty undermine personal security concerns, an emphasis on stability to promote economic and social development, a reverence for traditional values and culture, an emphasis on education and self-discipline, and acceptance of diversity of spiritual and philosophical authority in theory, but enforced social consensus among such diversity in practice.⁽³³⁾

Those who may have been expecting Asian Values to be substantially different from what is valued in Western countries like Canada may be rightfully surprised. Many, if not most of the values described above, are also deeply held by individuals and communities across the political and socio-economic spectrum in Canada, especially among the conservative components of Canadian society. Indeed, even in the United States, the platforms of both the Democratic and Republican Presidential candidates during the 1996 election campaign were attempting to outdo each other in being seen as the champion of many, if not most, of the values ascribed to the core components of Asian Values, especially on the importance of family values and the need for more effective law and order. The world is a very strange place.

Are Asian Values incompatible with Universal Conceptions of Human Rights?

"People are of primary importance. The State is of less importance. The sovereign is of least importance."

Mencius, (the great Confucian disciple, 372-289 B.C.)

The Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Relations recently initiated a project on "The Growth of East Asia and its impact on Human Rights". In March of 1996, the Council brought together in Bangkok some of Asia's (and a few of America's) leading thinkers on the cultural sources of Human Rights in East Asia.⁽³⁴⁾

In the workshop, the Asian participants recognised that fundamental behavioural and ethical norms of some of Asia's distinct cultures and histories could form the basis of human rights. These included the Buddhist duty of "avihimsa (nonviolence); the importance that Islam places on "umma" (community) and equality before God and Confucian "ren" (humanity).⁽³⁵⁾ Many of the Asian thinkers acknowledged that reliance on fundamental norms of these Asian religious and philosophical thinkers would not be an adequate method of understanding the basis of human rights in any Asian society, given that beliefs change over time and are not held by all in any particular Asian society, particularly in heterogenous societies like Malaysia.⁽³⁶⁾ Abdullahi An-Na'im, the leading Malaysian scholar in the field, also pointed out that material conditions are a component of culture as are other struggles with modernisation.

Sulak Sivaraksa, a leading Thai scholar, dealt with the issue that Buddhist traditions emphasize duties rather than rights. He asserted that human rights values can be inferred from the core principles of Buddhism, namely "dana" (generosity), "sila" (the ability not to exploit oneself or others) and "bhavana" (cultivating seeds of peace within the mind). He pointed out that elites could use some other aspects of Buddhism, such as the notion of "karma" to justify inequitable treatment in society.⁽³⁷⁾ Other Buddhist scholars noted that Buddhism makes little reference to political life, whether democratic or authoritarian, egalitarian or hierachical. Rather it concentrated on the spiritual pursuit of the path of the Buddha. This meant that support for human rights in Buddhist societies such as Thailand had to come from other sources, besides Buddhism.⁽³⁸⁾ I will suggest below, that this support comes from the inevitable push towards a universal cultural modernity in Asia.

In discussing the 1994 banning by Malaysia of a controversial Islamic group that rejected secular life, An-Na'im argued that the banning violated not only international human rights law, but also Islamic law. He put forward human rights concepts found in Islam supporting such a position, including the right to found a family, to freedom of religion and of movement and to practice one's culture.⁽³⁹⁾

There can be little doubt that the reason why Dr. Mahathir ignored such claims to both Islamic and international human rights norms was his profound belief in the priority of religious harmony and social stability.

A leading Islamic woman scholar, Norani Othman, also looked at the compatibility of Islam and women's rights in Malaysia. She asserted that women's rights concepts can be found in Islam, in the Qur'anic concept of human dignity (fitrah) which refers to humankind as "an undifferentiated whole" and Islam's inherent respect for pluralism and diversity. She asserted that Islamic law prohibited domestic violence against women and demanded equitable inheritance rules among male and female descendants.⁽⁴⁰⁾

It is an obvious thought that Othman's description does not describe the reality of women in many Islamic societies around the world, especially those governed by fundamentalist Islamic rulers, such as the present day Taliban government in Afghanistan.

As regards the Confucian heritage found in many of Asia's most economically vibrant societies such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China (recently revived), Vietnam and even Japan, the commonly held view is that this heritage is inherently authoritarian, prone to hierarchy and elite control with an emphasis on the rights of society over those of the individual.⁽⁴¹⁾

In this regard, the second most populous country in the region, Indonesia, also follows the neo-Confucian traditions. The making of the Indonesian State was modelled on the traditional "desa" (village) in which the traditional conception of the individual and the society were expressed in the term "aku" which embraces the entire community of which the individual forms a part. In such an environment, where "to impose one's individuality is considered by some an offense against harmonious communal life", problems arise when Indonesia is confronted with human rights claims based on individual rights.⁽⁴²⁾

At the Carnegie Council workshop, a leading Hong Kong scholar, Joseph Chan argued that with the decline of Marxism, the moral void would be filled by resurgent nationalism and a return to Confucian values, which would be compatible with generating respect for human rights. Chan asserted that human rights are necessary for the protection of "ren" (humanity) as a last resort when the Confucian notion of virtue fails to uphold social relationships. He goes on to argue that while Confucianism would support certain basic freedoms such as freedom of expression and religion, it would insist that human rights cannot be substituted for virtuous behaviour in most societal relationships. However, where such virtuous relationships cannot exist, Chan argues that human rights are needed in their absence. However, rights and especially civil liberties should not protect nonvirtuous conduct such as pornography.⁽⁴³⁾

It is clear that whether Asian cultural, philosophical and religious traditions are compatible with human rights depends on who gets to interpret these Asian traditions.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Ruling elites can declare much of what is considered universal concepts of human rights unacceptable under each of the Asian cultures described above to enforce regime legitimation, silence dissenting voices and to maintain power.

If the ruling elites of Asia were to have as their objective the showcasing of Asian culture and values as promoting universal conceptions of human rights, they could easily find the arguments, especially if they focused on the great Hindu and Buddhist traditions of Asia and Indo-China. As one scholar puts it:⁽⁴⁵⁾

"It is the basic idea of humanity as part of the absolute, of man as an immortal spirit as part of the cosmos which in Hinduism becomes the source of human dignity: the dignity in all men and women which is also tied up with the larger concept of rightness (dharma). Hinduism speaks not of rights as such, but of freedoms and virtues some of which it shares with Buddhism. In substance however, many of these freedoms and virtues are not very different from some of the modern human rights formulations. The freedoms are: (1) freedom from violence (Ahimsa), (2) freedom from want (Asteya), (3) freedom from exploitation (Aparigraha), (4) freedom from violation and dishonour (Avyabhichara) and (5) freedom from early death and disease (Armitetra and Aregya). The virtues are (1) absence of intolerance (Akrodha), (2) compassion or fellow feeling (Bhutadaya, Adreba), (3) knowledge (Jnana, Vidya), (4) freedom from thought and conscience (Satya, sumta) and (5) freedom from fear and frustration or despair (Pravrtti, Abhaya Dhrti)."

Indeed, one could make a compelling argument that the ancient Hindu and Buddhist civilizations of Asia imprinted the notions of equality of all human beings⁽⁴⁶⁾ and the inherent human dignity of all human beings on most Asian cultures long before the John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Jefferson walked the face of the earth.

Finally, the motivating force between the alleged clash between Asian Values and Western concepts of human rights may be the desire to place societal goals such as economic development always ahead of respect for fundamental rights. There is no practical reason to insist on such a rigid hierarchy, and a recent Canadian initiative in China illustrates how Canada could play a special role in engaging in the Asian Values dialogue to promote a less rigid understanding of balancing individual rights and collective goals.

On June 24-25, 1996, a rare event took place in China. One of the first unofficial international conferences in China on the subject of human rights was held in Beijing. The conference, jointly organised by Beijing University and the Human Rights Centre at the University of Ottawa, was the climax of a two-year dialogue on human rights between Chinese intellectuals and policymakers, including two of the authors of the 1991 White Paper on Human Rights, and their Canadian counterparts from across the country. Chinese and Canadians found common ground on important areas of human rights, including the following:

First, despite different origins of the human rights debate in the West and China, today both Chinese and Canadians could agree that the primordial source of human rights obligations is the concept of human dignity. Second, the right to development, which is essentially a collective right, and the civil and political rights of the individual need not be placed in a hierarchy to each other. Canadian constitutional jurisprudence and traditions have shown that collective and individual rights can be balanced in a fashion that promotes universal concepts of justice and proportionality. Two of these conceptions involve the acceptance of "the rule of law" and the principle that the end justifies the means cannot be the sole justification of rights limiting governmental actions.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Canada has a vital role to play in ensuring that the common ground in the cultural battle over human rights is fleshed out and implemented in a spirit of mutual benefit and equality.

Why has the clash between Asian Values and Western Concepts of Human Rights been nurtured by Asian leaders?

If, from the above discussion, it is accepted that the clash between Asian Values and human hights is more apparent than real, I suggest that Asian leaders nurture the conflict primarily for regime legitimation.

I suggest that regime legitimation includes legitimation of the present economic system of what is termed authoritarian capitalism. Many authoritarian countries, not just in Asia, have shown dramatic economic growth through private investment under authoritarian regimes.⁽⁴⁸⁾ The regime in the case of countries such as Brazil, Chile, South Korea and Taiwan was either a military or party authority which was internally unified. These authoritarian regimes acted in partnership with private capitalists and extensive foreign capital, including the World Bank, foreign commercial banks, U.S. aid and other sources.⁽⁴⁹⁾ As discussed above, many of these countries also focused on low-cost, export orientated industrialisation strategies that depend on labour and other input cost containment and independent labour union suppression.⁽⁵⁰⁾ In addition, in the case of some of the authoritarian regimes, a large part of the total economic output came from increased agricultural output.⁽⁵¹⁾ The World Bank offers a different assessment of Asian authoritarian capitalism. The Bank has attempted to counter the allegation by economists and political scientists that the East Asian miracle is due to the authoritarian nature of the region's institutions. These analysts, the World Bank alleges, describe East Asian political regimes as 'developmental states' in which powerful technocratic bureaucracies, shielded from political pressure, devise and implement well-honed interventions.⁽⁵²⁾

The World Bank offers a kinder, gentler version of Asian authoritarian capitalism when it states "...We believe developmental state models overlook the central role of government-private sector cooperation. While leaders of the high performing Asian economies have tended to be either authoritarian or paternalistic, they have been willing to grant a voice and genuine authority to a technocratic elite and key leaders of the private sector."⁽⁵³⁾ The Bank goes on to assert that to establish their legitimacy and with the support of society at large, East Asian leaders established the principle of shared growth, promising that as the economy expanded all groups would benefit.⁽⁵⁴⁾ The massive assumption by the World Bank and all others who attempt a soft-sell of authoritarian capitalism is that the authoritarian rulers can continue to guarantee shared growth for all in society.

This assumption seems immediately questionable to the extent one understands the success of authoritarian capitalist models as relying on labour and other input cost containment together with labour suppression and political control over even the emerging business and professional classes that they have teamed up with. Sen recognizes authoritarian South East Asian countries' labour policies, in particular their ability to ensure much greater managerial autonomy and discretion, as one important factor in these countries' developmental success. This labour policy may even be compatible with the human resource development success that these same countries are often noted for, but such success may not be sufficient to maintain regime legitimacy. Kuruvilla suggests that over time, as some Asian countries have moved from a low-cost export-oriented industrialisation strategy to a higher value added export-oriented strategy, their industrial relations strategy has tended to shift from cost containment and union suppression to work force flexibility and skills development.⁽⁵⁵⁾ However, while blatant bans on unionization or strikes or high government intervention in union recognition and dispute settlement may not be as common as they once were in countries such as Malaysia and Singapore, the authoritarian foundations of many Asian countries' labour market systems continue to pose a significant challenge to their legitimacy among the working class. Even if Asian economies can deliver increasing incomes to all over time, an assertion which is increasingly being questioned, the promise of higher incomes may already be declining in relative utility as compared to rights and participation, and authoritarian regimes will have to begin to reform their institutions, including dispersing power from the executive branch of government, to maintain their legitimacy.

One China analyst has noted that, historically, the crisis point in autocratic regimes came precisely when large numbers of new professional elites emerged to assist with the modernisation of society but who were still not fully incorporated into political life through democratic reform.⁽⁵⁶⁾ This same author continues, "...In this sense, it is not, as Marx said, modern capitalist economies but rather autocratic regimes that seek to preserve absolute power while encouraging the growth of modern business and professional elites that is creating its own 'gravediggers'."⁽⁵⁷⁾

It should be noted, however, that the creation of a business class or bourgeoisie middle class, per se, will not automatically lead to a push for democratic reforms and human rights. As one writer has noted, "...The new authoritarian rulers were welcomed because they usually promoted business interests further by suppressing demands by labour and other groups that opposed favouritism and economic policies facilitating the inegalitarian distribution of wealth. Thus the bourgeoisie in developing countries has not been a social class that defended individual rights and civil liberties nor one that has been suspicious of absolute state power. On the contrary it has preferred a conservative and authoritarian state that would maintain the economic system and the status quo".⁽⁵⁸⁾ Moreover, many members of the business middle class in countries such as Indonesia have extended their hegemony with the authoritarian rulers by rampant nepotism and corruption. Transparency International has consistently ranked Indonesia at the top among the most corrupt places in the world in which to do business.

Perhaps it is the fear of history's epitaph to Asian authoritarian capitalism that drives Asia's authoritarian rulers in quest of Asian Values to fend off the inevitable. The fear of human rights may be the fear of individualism and what it may do to the socio-economic system. As one writer notes, "Individualist cultures encourage and reward innovation by free-spirited entrepreneurs who are as likely to challenge the political status quo as to upset market arrangements. Most Asian economies, however, have either attempted autarky or have relied upon imitation, requiring access to open markets of more advanced economies. But the considerable success of many so-called miracle economies may not last. Unless they produce homegrown entrepreneurs and technological change, the technological gap will widen as innovators seek greater political and economic freedom outside the region."⁽⁵⁹⁾ The same writer concludes that East Asian authoritarian capitalist regimes cannot last forever. The autocrats and their dynastic heirs are mortal and modernisation stemming from economic prosperity will undermine their authority.⁽⁶⁰⁾

Indeed Japan, Thailand, Taiwan and especially South Korea provide real proof of the ultimate demise of Asian authoritarian rulers who seek to utilize Asian Values as regime legitimation. In the case of South Korea, on August 26, 1996, the Seoul district court "administered a political catharsis that symbolizes the end of South Korea's authoritarian past"⁽⁶¹⁾ by sentencing former President Chun Doo Hwan to death and his successor Roh Tae Woo to twenty-two and a half years in prison. Chun and Roh were the most high profile of 16 former army generals and a bevy of South Korea's corporate elites who were on trial for crimes ranging from murder of the Kwangju massacre victims, treason, bribery and corruption.⁽⁶²⁾ No doubt Chun and Roh also propounded Asian Values to legitimise their regimes.

In light of this analysis, the Canadian government and Canadian business should be cautious not to be seen as uncritical supporters of what may well be transitional authoritarian regimes in Asia.

The manufactured clash between Asian Values and Human Rights; a marker on the evolution towards a "global cultural modernity".

Asia is the 21st Century's battleground for the evolution of a "global cultural modernity".

Masakazu Yamazaki, in his essay in the journal "Foreign Affairs", defines modernity as "the spirit of living in constant contrast to the past."⁽⁶³⁾

The manufactured clash by authoritarian Asian rulers between Asian Values and human rights is an attempt to seek an Asian modernity where one has never existed. Given the immense territory of Asia and the multiplicity of cultures, traditions, histories and even civilizations, the fact that there is an attempt to manufacture something called Asian Values is highly significant.

The irony of Asian Values, as Yamazaki has stated, is that "...What few have seen clearly, however, is that the force behind the convergence observable in the region today is modernity, which was born in the West but radically transformed both East and West in this century."⁽⁶⁴⁾ Yamazaki bases his theory on the notion that "culture" and "civilization" are two distinct concepts. He argues that a Western civilization arose through the rise and fall of different traditions and rulers, from Christianity which fused the Judaic and Hellenic traditions to the emergence of national languages, cultures and states. "...Under the civilizational umbrella dating back to the Roman Empire, and within the unifying framework of Christian civilization, the West set out on its journey toward a World civilization that would encompass national and ethnic civilizations and cultures alien to one another. The crucial factor in the process was that no single nation claimed the supranational umbrella as its own."⁽⁶⁵⁾

In contrast, Yamazaki asserts that Asia never had a comparable superstructure or civilization. Although some might argue that Chinese civilization has dominated the East, the Chinese civilization, in contrast to the Roman, was extremely exclusive of other cultures. Indeed, its dominance in the region may have excluded the development of an Asian civilization.⁽⁶⁶⁾

Yamazaki then describes what this author would assert is the emergence of a "global cultural modernity" in Asia in the following terms:

...the peoples of East Asia...can be said to partake of modern Western civilization at the topmost stratum of their world, to retain their national civilizations and nation-states in the middle stratum, and to preserve their traditional cultures in their day-to-day lives. In political affairs, human rights and democratic principles belong to the first stratum, distinct bodies of law and political institutions to the second, and the political wheeling and dealing to the third.⁽⁶⁷⁾

In fact, the author, without knowing it or at least saying it, is describing perfectly the global cultural modernity that characterises modern Japan. Indeed, some argue that Japan should take a stronger role in promoting democratic reforms and human rights across Asia, given its economic power and prestige.⁽⁶⁸⁾ The newer democracies in Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines can also be similarly characterised. President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines has consistently rejected the position of other Asian leaders that Asian priorities to economic development or Asian Values should ride roughshod over human rights and constitutional guarantees.

The authoritarian rulers in Singapore and Malaysia are struggling not to be the newest members of the Asian global cultural modernity, despite socio-economic and political forces that are propelling them to this evolving sphere of Asian civilization. Key intellectual and civil society leaders in both countries are urging full membership in the community of democratic states.⁽⁶⁹⁾ The Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mr. Anwar Ibrahim, although intensely disliking what he calls the sermonising and hectoring tone of the West on human rights⁽⁷⁰⁾, acknowledges the possibility of a global cultural modernity in these words:

"If we in Asia want to speak credibly of Asian Values, we too must be prepared to champion these ideals which are universal and which belong to humanity as a whole. It is altogether shameful, if ingenious, to cite Asian Values as an excuse for autocratic practices and denial of basic rights and civil liberties. To say that freedom is western or unAsian is to offend our traditions as well as our forefathers who gave their lives in the struggle against tyranny and injustices. It is true that Asians lay great emphasis on order and social stability. But it is certainly wrong to regard society as a kind of false god upon altar [sic] the individual must constantly be sacrificed. No Asian tradition can be cited to support the proposition that in Asia the individual must melt into the faceless community."⁽⁷¹⁾

The Deputy Prime Minister and heir apparent to Dr. Mahathir has also emphasized that development cannot be used as an apology for authoritarianism. He has asserted that authoritarian rule has more often than not been used "as a masquerade for keptocracies, bureaucratic incompetence and worst of all, for unbridled nepotism and corruption".⁽⁷²⁾

Indeed, the recent retrenchment in both China and Indonesia in the area of human rights may be signals that the ailing leadership in both countries are sensing the inevitable fall of their regimes to this global cultural modernity and that they wish to put it off for as long as possible.

Yamazaki concludes that the most positive outcome for the East Asian region would not be mere diversity, but a civilizational framework that encompasses a well-regulated market, human rights and democratic principles.⁽⁷³⁾

Conclusion and Canada's Role in the debate over Asian Values and Human Rights.

If Yamazaki's thesis about the emergence of a civilizational three stratum framework in Asia is correct, then Canada is one of the Western countries most capable of conducting a global cultural modernity conversation with Asia. But first, one must articulate why the United States may not be the most effective lead conversationalist in this area. Neither in its political or constitutional structures does the political society in the United States acknowledge the possibility of multiple identities which are key to the three stratum civilizational framework described by Yamazaki.

American political and constitutional culture, traditions and structures melt all identities into a single national culture and identity⁽⁷⁴⁾ that instills the fear of hegemony around the world in all areas from culture to human rights. If the United States is seen as the standard bearer of the emerging global cultural modernity, a call to crude nationalism by authoritarian rulers against American leadership in the area of human rights will be highly effective. China's leadership may be quite content at how easily they have turned American concerns about human rights in China into a slight against the Chinese people and civilization.⁽⁷⁵⁾

In contrast Canada, with its own political, ethnic, racial, linguistic and regional divisions, seems to be perpetually in search of its own form of global cultural modernity. One could argue that Canadians also are searching for a societal framework for partaking of modern Western civilization at the topmost stratum, including respect for fundamental human rights. At the same time we seek in the framework to retain the confederational bargain of the various regions of the country. Finally, we struggle to preserve and promote, within the framework, the traditional cultures and traditions of the various minorities and aboriginal peoples of Canada, while resisting the possible separation of the province of Quebec.⁽⁷⁶⁾

This struggle for our Canadian niche in the global cultural modernity does not go unnoticed in Asia. Talking to Chinese colleagues at a human rights workshop in Ottawa just before the last referendum in Quebec in October of 1995, was a great lesson in how important Canada is in the debate over Asian Values and human rights. These colleagues, as well as many of the leading intellectuals and policy makers that this author encountered at a recent conference in Beijing, were genuinely impressed that a national government, and indeed Canadian society, would allow a substantial part of its society to make up its own mind whether it wanted to stay or go. Canada's commitment to democracy, tolerance and non-violence is a great teacher by example.

Because this country profoundly believes in pluralism and that democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights can promote stability, it has a duty to be a bridge to Asia on the question of collective values and human rights. Because this country has, through its constitution and its courts, developed universal conceptions of justice and proportionality to balance collective interests with fundamental rights and freedoms, it has a duty to engage in the dialogue on Asian Values and human rights. Finally, because of the genuine humility of Canada in that it professes to be a "work-in-progress" attempting to carve its own niche in the global cultural modernity, admitting to mistakes, but rarely trumpeting its successes, it should be confident that, over time, Asia and Asian leaders will listen to what it has to say. Time will tell.

Endnotes

1. Professor of Law, Director of the Human Rights Research and Education Centre, University of Ottawa, Editor-in-Chief, National Journal of Constitutional Law and member of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. The author wishes to thank Anne-Marie Traeholt and Robert Sinding for their invaluable research assistance for this article.

2. Cited in Hoong-Phun Lee, "Constitutional Values in Turbulent Asia," Papers of the 14th Lawasia Biennial Conference, August 16-20, 1995, Beijing, China.

3. Ibid.

4. See The Far Eastern Economic Review, October 3, 1996, 22.

5. In the 1993 summer edition of Foreign Affairs, Professor Samuel P. Huntington articulated a post Cold War vision of the world which focused on a global emphasis and persistence of cultural and civilizational divisions. In this vision Confucian civilization and Islamic civilization would pose the most conflictual problems with the West and hence be a major source of global instability. This author would moderate the Huntington thesis with the explanation that the nurtured clash of civilizations is a marker on an ineluctable road to a global cultural modernity.

6. For an excellent analysis of the human rights situation in Indonesia, see Todung Mulya Lubis, In Search of Human Rights: Legal-Political Dilemmas of Indonesia's New Order, 1966-1990, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1993).

7. For a good analysis of the recent street riots in Jakarta, see The Far Eastern Economic Review, August 6, 1996, 14.

8. Hoong-phun Lee, "Constitutional Values in Turbulent Asia," 2.

9. S. Kuruvilla, "Linkages Between Industrialization Strategies and Industrial Relations/Human Resource Policies: Singapore, Malaysia, The Philippines, and India," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 49, no. 4 (July 1996), 635.

10. Ozay Mehmet, "Rent-Seeking and Gate-Keeping in Indonesia: A Cultural and Economic Analysis," Labour, Capital and Society 27, no. 1 (April, 1994), 56.

11. For a detailed analysis of how in particular national emergency and preventive detention laws have been misused in Malaysia and Singapore, see Hoong-phun Lee, "Constitutional Values in Turbulent Asia," 6-12.

12. Cited in Hoong-phun Lee, "Constitutional Values in Turbulent Asia," 3-4.

13. Alan Dupont, "Is there an 'Asian Way'?" Survival 38, no. 2, (Summer 1996), 25.

14. Ibid., 14.

15. See, for example, Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Way," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1, (Jan/Feb 1995); Lee Kuan Yew, "Culture is Destiny," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2, (Mar/Apr 1994), 114; Koh, "Does East Asia Stand for Any Positive Values?" International Herald Tribune, December 11-12, 1993.

16. Goh Chok Tong, "Social Values, Singapore Style," Current History (December 1994) 417.

17. Dupont, "Is There An 'Asian Way'?" 14.

18. See The Far Eastern Economic Review, August 1, 1996, 38.

19. Bilahari Kausikan, "Asia's Different Standard," Foreign Policy 32, no. 92 (Autumn 1993), 26.

20. Dupont, "Is There An 'Asian Way'?" 14-15.

21. See The Far Eastern Economic Review, October 28, 1996, 18-27, in particular 19-21.

22. Ibid.

23. Speech by Dr. Mahathir at the Senate House, Cambridge University, March 15, 1995, cited in Dupont, "Is There An 'Asian Way'?" 15-16.

24. Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights (Bangkok, March 29 - April 2, 1993), UN Doc. A/Conf.157/ASRM/ paragraph 8.

25. Sophia Woodman, "Asian Views: Defining Human Rights for a Region?", Human Rights in China (Winter 1994), 14.

26. For Asian NGOs' reaction to the governmental Bangkok Declaration, see Our Voice: Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights. Reports of the Asia Pacific NGO Conference on Human Rights and NGOs' Statements to the Asia Regional Meeting (Bangkok: Asian Cultural Forum on Development, 1993.)

27. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (July 12, 1993).

28. See The Far Eastern Economic Review, October 24, 1996, 28.

29. Ibid.

30. See Dupont, "Is There An 'Asian Way'?" 22-23.

31. See The Far Eastern Economic Review, October 3, 1996, 24.

32. Ibid.

33. These components of Asian Values have been described, catalogued and analyzed extensively elsewhere, see, for example, R. Little and W. Reed, The Confucian Renaissance (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1989); Lawson, "Culture, Democracy and Political Conflict Management in Asia and the Pacific: An Agenda for Research," Pacific Review 6, no. 2, (October-November 1994); M. Haas, "Asian Culture and International Relations," in Jongsuk Chay, ed., Culture and International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1990); Desmond Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asian Pacific Region," Security Studies 3, no. 1, (Autumn 1993), 23; Dupont, "Is There An 'Asian Way'?" 16-17.

34. The workshop report, prepared by Maria Serena Diokno of the Philippines, entitled "Cultural Sources of Human Rights in East Asia: Consensus Building Toward a Rights Regime", is published in the Carnegie Council's bulletin Human Rights Dialogue 5 (June 1996). Hereafter cited as "Cultural Sources of Human Rights in East Asia."

35. Ibid., 5.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., 5-6.

40. Ibid., 6.

41. Ibid.

42. Satjipto Rahardjo, "Between Two Worlds: Modern State and Traditional Society in Indonesia," Law and Society Review 8, no. 3 (1994). The author is also a leading member of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission, Komnas Ham.

43. Carnegie Council, "Cultural Sources of Human Rights in East Asia", 6. Another excellent discussion of the moral basis for making claims against the state in China can be found in the paper "Cultural and Political Determinants of the Chinese Approach to Human Rights," by Professor J. Paltiel of Carleton University (this paper was written for the above mentioned joint project between the Internatnional Law Institute and the Human Rights Research and Education Centre -- to be published as part of the collection of papers of the project).

44. Ibid.

45. Samuel K. Murumba, "The Cultural and Conceptual Basis of Human Rights Norms in International Law," (Ph.D thesis, Monash University Melbourne, 1986), cited in Hoong-Phun Lee, "Constitutional Values in Turbulent Asia," 15.

46. Ibid.

47. The thesis that Canada could be a good dialogue partner with China in the area of balancing collective and individual rights was put forward by this author in a paper entitled "The Legal and Constitutional Basis of Human Rights, the Right to Development and the Law of Proportionality: A Canadian Attempt to Bridge the Turbulent Waters between Chinese and Western Conceptions of Human Rights." This paper, together with all other papers from a two year CIDA funded joint project between the International Law Institute at Peking University and the Human Rights Research and Education Centre, University of Ottawa, will be published in a forthcoming text entitled "Engaging the Dragon: A Canada-China Dialogue on Human Rights."

48. See, for example, J.A. Goldstone, "The Coming Chinese Collapse," Foreign Policy (Summer 1995), 35.

49. Ibid.

50. Ozay Mehmet, "Rent-Seeking and Gate-Keeping in Indonesia: A Cultural and Economic Analysis," Labour, Capital and Society 27, no. 1 (April, 1994), 56.

51. J.A. Goldstone, "The Coming Chinese Collapse," Foreign Policy, (Summer 1995).

52. The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, (Washington, D.C.: 1993), 13.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. S. Kuruvilla, "Linkages Between Industrialization Strategies and Industrial Relations/Human Resource Policies: Singapore, Malaysia, The Philippines, and India," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 49, no. 4 (July 1996), 635.

56. J.A. Goldstone, "The Coming Chinese Collapse," 44.

57. Ibid., 44.

58. Zehra F. Arat, Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 40.

59. Christopher Lingle, "The Propaganda Way," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995) 196.

60. Ibid.

61. The Far Eastern Economic Review, September 5, 1996, 21.

62. Ibid.

63. Masakazu Yamazaki, "Asia, a Civilisation in the Making," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4, (July/August 1996), 118.

64. Ibid., 107.

65. Ibid., 109.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., 116.

68. See, for example, David Arase, "Japanese Policy Toward Democracy and Human Rights in Asia," Asian Survey XXXIII, no. 10, (October 1993).

69. See, for example, Melanie Chew, "Human Rights in Singapore: Perceptions and Problems," Asian Survey XXXIV, no. 11, (November 1994).

70. See The Far Eastern Economic Review, June 2, 1994, 20.

71. Address entitled "Media and Society in Asia," keynote speech at the Asian Press Forum, Hong Kong (Dec. 2, 1994), 3-4. Cited in Hoong-Phun Lee, "Constitutional Values in Turbulent Asia", 17.

72. Ibid., 17-18.

73. Mazakazu Yamazaki, "Asia, a Civilization in the Making", 118.

74. See Nathan Glazer, "Individual Rights against Group Rights" and Michael Walzer "Pluralism: A Political Perspective" in Will Kymlicka, The Rights of Minority Cultures, (Oxford University Press, 1995), 123 and 139.

75. See The Far Eastern Economic Review, October 3, 1996, 22.

76. For a thoughtful attempt to explain this heroic effort at nation-building, see Donald G. Lenihan, Gordon Robertson and Roger Tassé, Canada: Reclaiming the Middle Ground (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1994.)